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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; diminished capacity, mental disease,
voluntary intoxication
Penal Code §§28, 29 (new); §§21, 22, 26, 188, 189 (amended).
SB 54 (Roberti); STATS. 1981, Ch 404
Chapter 404 eliminates the judicial defense of diminshed capacity'
and changes the permissible use of evidence2 and expert testimony re-
lating to mental disease3 and voluntary intoxication.4 Additionally,
Chapter 404 alters certain definitions pertaining to murder' and the
general definition of intent.6
The California Supreme Court developed the defense of diminished
capacity7 in response to a perceived injustice in the strict application of
the insanity defense." This defense was maintained by a showing that
the defendant lacked the capacity to form the specific intent required
for certain crimes9 because of a mental defect, disease, or other abnor-
mality. 10 A finding of diminished capacity would result in a verdict of
not guilty of the crime charged. " The defendant could be convicted on
a charge of a lesser crime that did not require specific intent, but absent
the applicability of a lesser crime the defendant would go free.12 Chap-
ter 404 declares that as a matter of public policy there will be no de-
fense of diminished capacity, 3 irresistible impulse, 14 or diminished
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §28(b). Compare People v. Cruz, 26 Cal. 3d 233, 605 P.2d 830,
162 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) and People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949) with CAL. PENAL
CODE §28(b).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §28(a).
3. See id. §29.
4. See id. §22.
5. See id. §§188, 189.
6. See id. §21.
7. See generally 26 Cal. 3d 233, 605 P.2d 830, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202
P.2d 53 (1949). See also People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 757, 518 P.2d 342, 347, 111 Cal. Rptr.
910, 915 (1974) (evidence of diminished capacity may negate existence of a specific mental state).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1016, 1026.
9. See generally id. §§187-199 (homicide).
10. See generally People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
11. See generally People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
12. See id. at 310, 411 P.2d at 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
13. See id. 411 P.2d at 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
14. See generally People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
See also CALJIC No. 4.05 (insanity---"irresistible impulse").
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responsibility.'5 Evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder may
not be used to negate the capacity of the defendant to form purpose,
intent, knowledge, malice aforethought, or other mental state.' 6 This
evidence may be used, however, to prove that the defendant did not in
fact form the required mental state.' 7 Chapter 404 also prohibits the
use of expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental illness, disor-
der, or defect' 8 in the guilt phase of a criminal trial to show that the
defendant did not have the mental state required for the crime.' 9
Chapter 404 specifies that the question of whether the defendant had
the required mental state is to be decided by the trier of fact.20 On the
question of whether the Legislature may completely prohibit the use of
this evidence the California Supreme Court has held that "we do not
perceive how a defendant who has in his possession evidence which
rebuts an element of the crime can logically be denied the right to pres-
ent that evidence merely because it will result in his acquittal,"'" and
that "not allowing the defendant to disprove mental state would consti-
tute an invalid interference with the trial process. 22 Chapter 404 ap-
parently does not challenge these requirements directly because while it
prohibits the defendant from proving lack of capacity to form the spe-
cific intent, it allows the defendant to show that infact he or she did not
form that intent.23 Thus, the question remains whether diminished ca-
pacity as a defense actually has been eliminated completely.
Prior law required that evidence of voluntary intoxication could not
be considered by the jury unless the intoxication actually affected the
existence of any specific requirement including purpose, motive, and
intent.24 Under Chapter 404, an act is no less criminal because of that
person's voluntary intoxication.25 Chapter 404 specifically provides
that capacity to form any mental state is not negated by evidence of
15. CAL. PENAL CODE §28(b).
16. Id. §28(a). See also id. §28(c) (this section does not affect insanity hearing pursuant to
California Penal Code Sections 1026, 1429.5).
17. See id. §28(a).
18. Id. §29. See generally Berman & Hunt, Criminal Law and Psychiatry: The Soviet Sole-
lion, 2 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1950).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE §29.
20. Id.
21. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 328, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 272
(1978).
22. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 346, 202 P.2d 53, 63 (1949). See also In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (the United States Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
23. Compare People v. Cruz, 26 Cal. 3d 233,605 P.2d 830, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) and 33 Cal.
2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949) with CAL. PENAL CODE §28(b).
24. See CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, §8, at 230 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §22). See generally
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE §22(a).
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voluntary intoxication.26 When the actual existence of any mental state
is a necessary element of the offense, however, evidence of voluntary
intoxication is admissible to show that the defendant did not in fact
form the required mental state.27 Chapter 404 also expands the defini-
tion of voluntary intoxication to include ingestion or injection of any
intoxicating drug or other substance.28
Prior to Chapter 404 intent of the defendant was manifested by the
circumstances connected with the offense and the defendant's sound
mind and discretion.2 9 In addition, persons of sound mind were de-
fined as all who were not idiots, lunatics, or affected with insanity.
30
Under Chapter 404, intent is manifested only by the circumstances con-
nected to the offense.3' In addition, Chapter 404 eliminates lunatics
and insane persons from the list of persons not capable of committing
crimes, 32 apparently to remove the issue of sanity from the guilt phase
of a trial.33
The California Supreme Court in People v. Wol4 established that
to prove a killing was deliberate and premeditated as required for first
degree murder, the prosecution must establish that the defendant ma-
turely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of the act.35 Chap-
ter 404 specifically provides that this showing is not necessary to prove
first degree murder.36 Existing law states that malice required for a
murder conviction 37 may be expressed or implied.38 Express malice is
established by a manifestation of a deliberate intention to take unlaw-
fully the life of a fellow creature.39 Implied malice is established when
there is no considerable provocation or the circumstances surrounding
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.40 In People v.
Coney4' the California Supreme Court held that in addition to express
or implied malice there also must be an awareness of the obligation to
26. See id.
27. See id. §22(b).
28. Compare id. §22(c) with CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, §8, at 230.
29. See CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, §8, at 230.
30. See id.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE §21.
32. Compare id. §26 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1181, §1, at 5285 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE
§26).
33. Telephone interview with Jeniffer Moss, Revision of the Penal Code Committee (Sept.
22, 1981) (notes on file at the PacAc Law Journal).
34. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
35. Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE §189.




41. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
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act within the general body of laws regulating society.42 Chapter 404
negates this holding by providing that this is not part of the definition
of malice and that no other mental state must be established other than
that required by existing law.43
42. See 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
43. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §188 with 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 411 P.2d at 918,49 Cal. Rptr. at
822.
Criminal Procedure; examination and investigation of mental
status
Penal Code §1027 (amended).
SB 590 (Rains); STATS. 1981, Ch 787
Support: California State Psychology Association
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; State Public
Defender
Chapter 787 was enacted to ensure that courts have discretionary
power to determine the admissibility of psychiatric evidence.' Existing
law specifies that when a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity2 the court must appoint two and may appoint three psychi-
atric experts. Prior law required the appointed experts to conduct an
investigation of the defendant's sanity.4 Chapter 787 directs these ex-
perts instead to examine the defendant and investigate his or her mental
status.' Furthermore, while the appointment of the experts continues
to carry the duty to testify whenever summoned in any proceeding
when the defendant's sanity is in question,6 Chapter 787 specifies the
matters that must be included in the testimony.7 Specifically, Chapter
787 provides that the testimony of the psychiatric experts must include,
but is not limited to: (1) the defendant's psychological history, (2) the
1. See generally Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, Press Release, Rains'Bill
to Curb Abuse of Psychiatric Testimony, Sept. 10, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacpe Law Journal).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1027. See generally Berman & Hunt, CriminalLaw andPsychia-
try: The Soviet Solution, 2 STAN. L. REv. 635 (1950).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §1027(a) (psychiatric expert must be a psychiatrist or licensed psychol-
ogist with a doctoral degree in psychology and at least five years of postgraduate experience in the
diagnosis and treatment of emotional and mental disorders).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 391, §2, at 1242 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §1027).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §1027. See Lewis, 12 COURTROOM MEDICINE §7.30 (mental status
examinations).
6. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1027 with CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 391, §2, at 1242.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1027(a). See also id. (allowing these court appointed experts, in ad-
dition to travel expenses, fees that seem just and reasonable to the court; this expense will be paid
by the county where the trial is held).
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facts surrounding the commission of the acts underlying the offense
charged that were used by the expert in his or her examination, and (3)
any present psychological or psychiatric symptoms of the defendant.
Many psychiatric experts are questioning whether they can deter-
mine reliably that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime by
post-arrest examinations.9 Thus, Chapter 787 declares that the statu-
tory provision for the examination and investigation of the mental sta-
tus of the defendant by appointed experts does not presume that the
experts can determine whether the defendant was sane or insane at the
time of the offense.' 0 Accordingly, the court is expressly granted dis-
cretion to admit or exclude any psychiatric or psychological evidence
regarding the defendant's state of mind or mental or emotional condi-
tion at the time of the offense."I
8. See id. §1027(b).
9. See generally Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, Press Release, Rains' Bill
to Curb Abuse ofPsychiatric Testimony, Sept. 10, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1027(c).
11. Id. (pursuant to the California Evidence Code).
Criminal Procedure; incompetent defendants
Penal Code §1372 (amended).
SB 1015 (Sieroty); STATS. 1981, Ch 611
Support: Department of Mental Health
Under existing law, when a defendant who was determined to be
incompetent to be tried or adjudged to punishment' regains compe-
tency,2 the county mental health director, the regional center director
(hereinafter referred to as the director), the medical director of the fa-
cility where the defendant is committed, or the defendant's conservator
will certify this fact to the court where the original determination of
incompetency was made.3 The court will then hold a hearing to deter-
mine if the defendant should be released on his or her own recogni-
zance or if bail should be set pending conclusion of the proceedings.
4
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 611, the defendant was sent to jail if
1. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1367-1375.5 (inquiry into the competence of the de-
fendant before trial or after conviction); see also id. §1201 (pronouncement of judgment after
recovery).
2. See id. §1374.
3. Id. § 1372(a), (b). See id. §1372(b) (the conservator must also certify the fact of regained
competency to the county sheriff and district attorney and the defendant's attorney of record).
4. See id. §1372(d).
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the court determined that neither alternative was appropriate.5 Upon
the recommendation of the director of the defendant's treatment facil-
ity, Chapter 611 allows the court, within its discretion, to have the de-
fendant instead returned to the original facility or a secure facility
approved by the director. The recommendation must be based on the
director's opinion that there is a substantial risk that a jail environment
would return the defendant to a state of incompetency or that the de-





Criminal Procedure; dismissal of charges, recordation of
reasons for disposition
Penal Code §§859c, 1192.6 (new); §§859b, 861, 1192.5, 1387
(amended).
AB 632 (Papan); STATS. 1981, Ch 759
AB 754 (Cramer); STATS. 1981, Ch 854
Support: California Highway Patrol; Department of Finance
A magistrate must dismiss a criminal complaint if the defendant has
not pleaded guilty and has remained in custody for ten or more court
days and the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond ten
court days from the date of the arraignment or plea.' This dismissal,
however, will not occur if the defendant personally waives the right to a
preliminary examination within the ten-court-day period or if the pros-
ecution establishes good cause2 for a continuance beyond the period.
Furthermore, if the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond
the ten-court-day period, release on the defendant's own recognizance4
is required unless the defendant is charged with a capital offense in a
cause "where proof is evident and the presumption is great."-, Chapter
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §859b. See generally 12 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1980
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 334-39 (1981).
2. See Blake v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 244, 248, 166 Cal. Rptr. 470, 472 (1980)
(discussing the good cause provision).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §859b.
4. See id. §1318 (description of release on defendant's own recognizance).
5. Id. §§859b, 861(b). This provision paraphrases the California constitutional require-
ments regarding the release of a criminal defendant on bail. CAL CONST., art. I, §12. An indict-
ment for a capital offense itself furnishes a presumption of guilt too great to entitle the defendant
to bail as a matter of right. People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862). It is not necessary that the
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854 additionally prohibits the defendant's release if the continuance be-
yond the ten-court-day period results from (1) the defendant's request
for a continuance of the preliminary examination beyond the ten-court-
day period,6 (2) unavailability of a necessary witness due to actions of
the defendant,7 (3) illness of counsel,' (4) counsel being unexpectedly
engaged in a jury trial,9 or (5) unforeseen conflicts of interest requiring
appointment of new counsel. 10 Furthermore, Chapter 854 permits the
magistrate to deny release on the defendant's own recognizance if the
offense charged is a violent felony and the continuance is requested
for a reason not attributable to the fault of the prosecution. 12 This pro-
vision shall become operative only if Senate Constitutional Amend-
ment No. 10 of the 1981-82 Regular Session of the Legislature is
adopted by the people.
Existing law requires that unless preliminary examinations are con-
ducted in one session, the complaint must be dismissed except in cases
when the magistrate postpones the preliminary examination for good
cause.' 3 The postponement, however, must not be for more than ten
court days absent a personal waiver by the defendant of the right to a
continuous preliminary examination or the establishment of good
cause by thd prosecution for a postponement beyond the ten-court-day
period."4 Chapter 854 requires that the defendant be released on his or
her own recognizance" if the preliminary examination is postponed
beyond the ten-court-day period. 6 In addition, Chapter 854 allows the
magistrate to interrupt the preliminary examination to conduct brief
court matters without being required to release the defendant, provided
that a substantial majority of the court's time is devoted to the prelimi-
nary examination.'
7
Finally, Chapter 854 adds the following two exceptions to the ex-
evidence be so convincing to justify a verdict; it is sufficient if it induces a belief that the defendant
has committed the crime. In re Page, 82 Cal. App. 576,578 (1927), ExParte Walpole, 85 Cal. 362,
368 (1890).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §§859b, 861(b).




11. See id. §677.5(c) (violent felonies defined for purposes of this section).
12. See id. §859c; CAL. STATs. 1981, c. 854, §5, at -.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §861.
14. See Id.
15. Id. §861(b) (this required release is subject, however, to the exceptions provided in Cali-
fornia Penal Code Section 859(b)).
16. Id.
17. See id. §861.
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isting requirement that a second order terminating an action' 8 is a bar
to subsequent prosecution for the same offense: (1) when a showing is
made that good cause existed for the delay of the preliminary examina-
tion beyond sixty days from the date of the arraignment or plea 9 or (2)
if the motion2" to extend the preliminary examination beyond the ten-
court-day period was granted because of the present insanity of the de-
fendant or the lack of counsel after the defendant elected to conduct his
or her own defense.2'
Although existing law requires a statement of reasons to be entered
on the record when the judge orders a dismissal of an action, prior to
the enactment of Chapter 759, the prosecutor was not required to state
the reasons for seeking the dismissal of the original charges. 22 Chapter
759 requires that in every felony case the prosecuting attorney must
state in open court the reasons for seeking a dismissal.23 In addition,
when the prosecuting attorney makes recommendations to the court re-
garding what punishment to impose or whether the court should exer-
cise any legal powers available to it upon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a felony charge, the specific reasons for these recommen-
dations must be stated in open court and made a part of the court file.2 4
This provision was enacted to prevent plea bargains from continuing to
be the semi-private dealing between the prosecutor and the defense at-
torney that is a primary source of the public's disillusion with the crimi-
nal justice system.25 Finally, Chapter 759 requires the court record to
contain the reasons for any amendment to dismissal of charges con-
tained in an original felony accusatory pleading.26
18. Id. §1387 (termination must be pursuant to California Penal Code Sections 859a, 861,
871, or 995).
19. See id. §1387(a).
20. Id. §1387(b) (motion must be made pursuant to California Penal Code Section 995).
21. Compare id. §1387 with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 938, §8, at-.
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1385.
23. See id. §1192.6(b).
24. See id. §1192.6(c).
25. See Assemblyman Louis J. Papan, Press Release, February 24, 1981.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1 192.6(a).
Criminal Procedure; exclusion of evidence-sexual conduct of
victim
Evidence Code §§782, 1103 (amended).
SB 23 (Watson); STATS. 1981, Ch 726
Pacdflc Law Journal Vol 13
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Support: Attorney General; California District Attorneys
Association
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; State Public
Defender
Under existing law, evidence of the character or a trait of character
in the form of opinion evidence,' reputation evidence,2 and evidence
concerning the complaining witness'3 sexual conduct are inadmissible
for proving the victim's consent in prosecutions of rape-related crimes.4
With the enactment of Chapter 726, opinion evidence, reputation evi-
dence, and evidence concerning the complaining witness' sexual con-
duct are also inadmissible for the purpose of proving the victim's
consent in prosecutions of crimes related to sodomy,5 oral copulation,6
or the penetration of genital or anal openings by a foreign object.7 Evi-
dence of the sexual conduct of a complaining witness is still admissible,
however, to show sexual conduct between the complaining witness and
the defendant,' to rebut evidence of sexual conduct introduced by the
prosecution,9 or to attack the credibility of the complaining witness.10
COMMENT
Statutes that restrict the admission of evidence of a victim's sexual
activity to prove the victim's consent in sex-related crimes have been
challenged as a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial, guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments." The chal-
lenge is based on the argument that the mandatory prohibition of this
evidence deprives defendants of the right to a fair opportunity of de-
1. 31 CAL. JUR. 3d Evidence §484 (1976) (definition of opinion evidence).
2. See id. §§206, 306 (definition of reputation evidence).
3. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§782(b), I103(b)(5) (definition of complaining witness).
4. Id. §1103(b)(1).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §286(a) (definition of sodomy).
6. See id. §288a(a) (definition of oral copulation).
7. See id. §289(b) (no part of the body can be considered a foreign object). Compare CAL.
EvID. CODE §1103(b)(1) with CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 569, §2, at 1388 (if the specified sex crime was
alleged to have occurred in a local detention facility or in a state prison, evidence of the com-
plaining witness' prior sexual conduct is admissible for the purpose of proving the victim's
consent).
8. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE §1103(b) with CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 569, §2, at 1388.
9. CAL. EviD. CODE §1103(b)(3).
10. Id. §§782(a), 1103(b)(4).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; amend. XIV, §1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §7(a). See Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws 4nd The Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 545,
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Tanford & Bocchino]; Comment, A Due Process Challenge To Restric-
tions On The Substantive Use OfEvidence Of4 Rape Prosecutrix's Prior Sexual Conduct, 9 U.C.D.
L. REv. 443, 445-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 4 Due Process Challenge].
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fense,12 as provided in the sixth amendment.' 3 The constitutionality of
statutes that restrict the admissibility of evidence of a victim's sexual
conduct to prove the victim's consent in sex-related crimes, however,
has been upheld by California courts.'
4
As an alternative to mandatory exclusion, recent commentary has
suggested that evidence concerning a victim's sexual conduct, offered to
show the victim's consent, should be determined to be either admissible
or inadmissible in the discretion of the court only after it balances the
defendant's need for the evidence with the state's interest in excluding
it.'" This would preserve the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
fair opportunity of defense by allowing the admission of evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct when its probative value outweighs the
state's interest for exclusion.'
6
12. SeeA Due Process Challenge, supra note 11, at 456 (a fair opportunity to defend includes
the right to confront and cross-examine the witness, and to offer evidence in defense).
13. See Tanford and Bocehino, supra note 11, at 555-60.
14. See People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 444, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980); People v.
Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 691, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 867 (1976).
15. See Tanford and Bocchino, supra note 11, at 565-66;A Due Process Challenge, supra note
11, at 473-74. See generally CAL. EvID. CODE §352.
16. See Tanford and Bocchino, supra note 11, at 565-66;4 Due Process Challenge, supra note
11, at 473-74.
Criminal Procedure; statute of limitations for felonies
Penal Code §800 (amended).
SB 311 (Holmdahl); STATS. 1981, Ch 1017
Chapter 1017 extends the statute of limitations for rape and related
offenses, and felony welfare fraud.' Chapter 1017 further provides that
the statute of limitations for any felony is now satisfied or tolled, by the
issuance of an arrest warrant.
Crimes Exceptedfrom the General Felony Statute of Limitations
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1017, the statute of limitations for
rape, rape in concert with another person, sodomy, or penetration of
anal or genital openings with a foreign object against the victim's will
was three years and lewd and lascivious acts upon the body of a child
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800.
2. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1307, §2, at - (amending CAL PENAL CODE
§800).
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under fourteen was five years.3 Thus, the state lost the ability to prose-
cute a suspected offender if an indictment or information was not
timely filed.4
Chapters 895, 901 and 909 extend the statute of limitations for the
specified crimes to six years.5 Chapter 1017 was enacted in part, in
response to the growing incidence of rape perpetrated by repeat offend-
ers over a period exceeding three years.6
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1017, the statute of limitations for
felony welfare fraud was three years from the date of commission .7 In
Gasaway v. Superior Court,' the State contended that welfare fraud
should be included in the definition of grand theft, and thus be ex-
cepted from the three year statute of limitations provided in the Penal
Code.9 The statute of limitations for grand theft does not begin to run
until three years after the discovery of the commission of those crimes."°
The court strictly interpreted the Code, however, stating that it was for
the Legislature to add enumerated exceptions to the general statute of
limitations for felonies." By specifically exempting felony welfare
fraud from the general statute, Chapter 1017 authorizes the court to
treat felony welfare fraud in the same manner as embezzlement of pub-
lic money and grand theft.' 2
Tolling and Satisfying the Statute
Prior law provided that the general statute of limitations for felonies
was satisfied by the filing of an information or the certification of a case
to the superior court within three years after the commisison or the
discovery of a crime. 3 Chapter 1017 specifies that the general statute
of limitations for felonies is now satisfied or tolled by the issuance of an
arrest warrant or the finding of an indictment after the commission14 or
the discovery 5 of a crime. 6 Chapter 1017 also provides that a pending
3. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1307, §2, at -. See also 13 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED
1982 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 634 (1982).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1307, §2, at -.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800(b).
6. See generally Assemblyman Byron D. Sher, News, June 30, 1981 (copy on file at the
Pacifc Law Journal).
7. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1307, §2, at -. See also 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES
Crimes Against Governmental Authority §896(h) (Supp. 1978).
8. 70 Cal. App. 3d 545, 139 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1977).
9. See id. at 549, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800(C).
11. See 70 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800(C).
13. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1307, §2, at -.
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800(a), (b).
15. See id. §800(c).
16. See id. §802.5.
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criminal action tolls the statute of limitations for the purposes of re-
commencing a criminal action in the event the first action is dismissed
subject to the provisions of the Penal Code.'7
Chapter 1017 is an apparent effort to reconcile statutory law with the
recent California Supreme Court decision in Hawkins v. Superior
Court. 8 In Hawkins, the Court held that accused persons are denied
equal protection of law guaranteed by the California Constitution'
when they are prosecuted by indictment, thus depriving them of a pre-
liminary hearing and its concomitant rights.2° Hawkins requires a
postindictment preliminary hearing if the defendant requests.2' A pos-
tindictment hearing, however, may involve the same witnesses and the
same case that the district attorney presented at the indictment; an ex-
pensive and duplicative effort.22 Allowing the statute of limitations to
be satisfied by the issuance of an arrest warrant eliminates the need for
an indictment to satisfy or toll the statute.23 Chapter 1017 retains in-
dictment as an alternative method for satisfying or tolling the statute.2"
Hawkins, however, still requires a postindictment preliminary hearing
in this situation.25
Chapter 1017 specifically expresses the intent of the Legislature that
the issuance of an arrest warrant to toll or satisfy the statute of limita-
tions will continue 26 only until a decision of a court of appeal, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, or an amendment to the Constitution provides
that a person charged by indictment is not entitled to a preliminary
hearing.27 Upon that occurrence, Chapter 1017 specifies that the stat-
ute of limitations will be satisfied or tolled by an information filed with.
or a case certified to, the superior court within the appropriate time
period.28
17. See id.
18. See 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). See generally 52 TEMP. L.Q. 1175 (1979);
13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1482 (1979).
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, §14 (felonies must be prosecuted as provided by law either by indict-
ment or after examination and commitment by a magistrate by information).
20. See United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393, 401 (1979) (explicating the holding in
Hawkins v. Superior Court).
21. See 22 Cal. 3d at 594, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
22. See conversation with Steven White, California District Attorneys Association (notes on
file at the Pacic Law Journal).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800. See also conversation with Steven White, California Dis-
trict Attorneys Association (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800.
25. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE §800.
27. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 1017, §4, at - (amending Cal. Penal Code §800). Compuare
CAL. STATS. 1981 c. 1017, §1, at - with Id. §2, at -.
28. Com pare CAL. STATS. 1981 C. 1017, §2, at - with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1207, §2, at -.
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Criminal Procedure; juvenile parole hearings
Welfare and Institutions Code §§1767, 1767.1 (new).
AB 13 (Moorehead); STATS. 1981, Ch 591
Support: Attorney General; California Peace Officers Association;
Department of Finance; Youth Authority
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California
State Public Defender
AB 1401 (Baker); STATS. 1981, Ch 645
Support: California Peace Officers Association; Department of Fi-
nance; Youth Authority
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California
State Public Defender
Existing law enables the Youthful Offender Parole Board (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Board) to conduct hearings to consider and review
parole of offenders committed to the Youth Authority.' In order to
ensure public input into Board decisions, Chapter 591 requires that
written notice of the scheduled hearing be given to (1) the judge of the
court that committed the person to the Youth Authority, (2) the attor-
ney for the person, (3) the district attorney of the county from which
the person was committed, (4) the law enforcement agency that investi-
gated the case, and (5) the victim of the offense or his or her next of kin
if notice has been requested Notice must be given at least thirty days
before the Board meets for parole review.4 Persons receiving notice
may not attend the parole hearings5 but may submit written statements
to the Board at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing for the
Board's consideration at the hearing. 6 Chapter 591 requires the presid-
ing officer at the hearing to state findings and supporting reasons for
the Board's decisions.7 The statement must be reduced to writing and
made available to the public for inspection no later than thirty days
1. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1731.5, 1766 (the person convicted of a crime
may not be committed to the Youth Authority if his or her sentence is death, life imprisonment, a
fine only, or less than 90 days imprisonment).
2. See CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 591, §2, at -. See also Assemblywoman Jean M. Moorehead,
Press Release, Moorehead Callsfor Open Parole Hearings, Dec. 2, 1980 (copy on file at the Pac#Fc
Law Journal).
3. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §1767. See also id. §707(b) (designating specific violent
offenses subject to parole consideration).
4. See id. §1767 (the burden is on the requesting party to keep the Board informed of his or
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after the hearing." In addition, Chapter 645 requires similar notifica-
tion9 for parole consideration of offenders under the age of 18,10 but
does not require public inspection of either Board decisions or the basis
for the decisions."
8. See id.
9. See id. §1767.1.
10. See id.
11. Compare id with id. § 1767.
Criminal Procedure; preliminary examinations
Penal Code §872 (amended).
AB 1016 (McCarthy); STATS. 1981, Ch 1026
Opposition: California Trial Lawyers Association
Existing law requires a preliminary examination of a felony criminal
case to which a defendant has not plead guilty by a magistrate to deter-
mine if there is sufficient cause' to require the defendant to answer.
2
Chapter 1026 specifically authorizes hearsay evidence,3 consisting of
written statements of the testimony of witnesses made under the pen-
alty of perjury, to be used in this preliminary examination in lieu of
testimony.4 A prosecuting attorney wishing to introduce a written
statement at the examination must file the statement with the court and
provide the defendant with copies either at the defendant's arraignment
or at least ten days prior to the date set for the preliminary examina-
tion.5 The written statements will not be considered as evidence at the
preliminary examination, however, if (1) the prosecuting attorney does
not comply with the filing and notice requirements, (2) the witness is a
victim of a crime against his or her person, or (3) the testimony of the
witness includes eyewitness 6 identification of the defendant.7
1. See People v. Upton, 257 Cal. App. 2d 677, 685, 65 Cal. Rptr. 103, 109 (1968); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (5th ed. 1979) (sufficient cause to hold defendant to answer charges is
reasonable or probable cause or that state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution to
conscientiously entertain strong suspicion of defendant's guilt).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §872(a); see id §859b. See generally B. WITKIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE Proceedings Before Trial §§132 (1963), 132A (Supp. 1978); 18 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal
Law §§534-546 (1975).
3. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1200(a) (definition of hearsay). See generally 31 CAL. JUR. 3d
Evidence §215-310 (1976).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §872(b).
5. See id.
6. Id. (an eyewitness is defined as any person who sees the perpetrator during the commis-
sion of the crime charged, whether or not identification of the perpetrator can be made).
7. Id.
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Chapter 1026 does not limit the right of the defendant to call and
cross-examine any witness whose written statement was introduced as
evidence regarding all matters asserted in the statement at the prelimi-
nary examination.' Furthermore, if the witness does not appear after
reasonable efforts by the defendant to secure attendance, the court must
grant a short continuance at the defendant's request and require the
prosecuting attorney to present the witness for cross-examination. 9 If
the prosecuting attorney fails to present the witness, the written state-





Criminal Procedure; final judgment-appeals
Penal Code §§1237, 1466 (amended).
AB 658 (Martinez); STATS. 1981, Ch 339
Opposition: Los Angeles Municipal Court Judges Association
Existing law allows a defendant, in both superior and inferior courts,
to appeal from a final judgment of conviction.' Under prior law, the
commitment of a defendant to detention for narcotics addiction2 was
considered to be a final judgment ninety days after the commitment.3
The ninety day period allowed for the possible rejection of the commit-
ment by the Director of Corrections, 4 and was to eliminate delay in
review of the criminal judgment.5 Chapter 339 eliminates the ninety
day waiting period for final judgment6 and deems a commitment for
narcotic addiction an immediate final judgment for the purpose of
appeal.
7
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1237(l), 1466(2); B. WrrsuN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE Appeal §647 (1963).
2. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3051.
3. See CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 315, §§2, 3, at 685 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§1237, 1466).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §5053 (definition of Director of Corrections); B. WITKJN, CALI-
FORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Appeal §647 (Supp. 1975).
5. See CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 315, §§2, 3, at 685. See generally People v. Gonzales, 68 Cal. 2d
467, 469-70, 67 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552-53 (1968). An addiction hearing is a civil proceeding distinct
from a criminal prosecution. A defendant in a narcotics conviction may appeal the criminal trial
and the commitment hearing.
6. Compare CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 315, §§2, 3, at 685 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1237, 1466.
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1237(1), 1466(2)(a).
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Criminal Procedure; unlawful taking of merchandise or library
materials
Penal Code §490.5 (amended).
AB 1678 (Young); STATS. 1981, Ch 650
Support: Department of Fair Employment and Housing
Opposition: National Organization for Women
Chapter 650 expands the authority of a merchant' or a library facil-
ity employee2 who detains persons suspected of unlawfully removing or
attempting to unlawfully remove merchandise3 or library materials4
from the premises.5 In addition, Chapter 650 revises existing statutory
provisions regarding defenses to civil actions of false arrest,6 false im-
prisonment,7 slander,' or unlawful detention arising from a detention
or an arrest.9
A merchant or a library employee having probable cause 0 to believe
a person is taking or attempting to take merchandise or library materi-
als from the premises unlawfully is authorized by existing law to detain
the person for a reasonable time and to examine any items inplain view
to determine ownership.' In addition, existing law allows the
merchant or library employee to use a reasonable amount of non-
deadly force for protection and to prevent the escape of the person de-
tained or the loss of the property.' 2 A peace officer who accepts cus-
tody of a person arrested for unlawfully removing merchandise or
library materials may search the person arrested and their immediate
possessions for any item alleged to have been taken.' 3 A merchant or
library employee that detains persons pursuant to Chapter 65014 may
request the person detained to surrender the item voluntarily 5 and, if
the person refuses, to conduct a reasonable and limited search. 16 The
search is limited to packages, shopping bags, handbags, or other prop-
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §490.5(g)(2) (definition of merchant).
2. Id. §490.5(g)(4) (definition of library facility).
3. Id. §490.5(g)(1) (definition of merchandise).
4. Id. §490.5(g)(3) (definition of book or other library materials).
5. Compare id. §490.5 with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 727, §1, at -.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §834 (definition of arrest).
7. Id. §236 (definition of false imprisonment).
8. CAL. CIw. CODE §46 (definition of slander).
9. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §490.5 with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 727, §1, at
10. BLACK'S LAW DiCMtONARY 1081 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of probable cause).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE §490.5(e)(3).
12. See id. §490.5(e)(2).
13. See1d. §490.5(e)(5).
14. Seeid. §490.5(e)(1).
15. See id. §490.5(e)(4).
16. Id.
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erty in the immediate possession of the person detained;' 7 the clothing
of the person may not be searched.'" In addition, Chapter 650 provides
that upon the surrender or discovery of an item taken unlawfully, the
person detained may be requested, but not required, to provide ade-
quate proof of their identity.'9
It is a defense to any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, slan-
der, or unlawful detention brought by a person detained that the
merchant or library employee had probable cause to believe the person
had stolen or attempted to steal merchandise or library materials and
that the merchant or library employee acted reasonably. 0 In Cervantez
v. J.C. Penney Co.,2 however, the California Supreme Court held that
a merchant's defense of probable cause was valid in an action arising
from a detention but not in an action arising from false arrest, the latter
considered a greater intrusion.22 Chapter 650 specifically extends this
defense to any civil action brought against a merchant or library em-




19. Id See also id. §490.5(h) (requires a library facility to post at its entrance and exit con-spicuous signs stating: "In order to prevent the theft of books and library materials, state law
authorizes the detention for a reasonable period of any person using these facilities suspected of
committing 'library theft' (Penal Code Section 490.5))."
20. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §490.5(e)(6) with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 727, §1, at -
21. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979).
22. Id. at 589-91, 595 P.2d at 981-82, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §490.5(e)(6).
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